Journal Entry of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s “Intuitionism” of Moral Skepticisms

Journal Entry of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong's "Intuitionism" of Moral Skepticisms

Summary

To avoid skeptical regress, we need turn to intuitions where the skeptical regress stops. According to Walter's definition of intuitionism, the simplitical intutionist claim is that "some moral beliefs are justified non-inferentially". What walter focuses on is neither specific areas conerning which moral beliefs are justified non-inferentially, nor which features of these moral beliefs make them justified non-inferentially, even nor psychological descriptions of ability to draw an inference or not. In contrast, he applies his arguments mainly to the central claim that all intuitionists share, namely, that "some believers are justified onn-inferentially in holding some moral beliefs."

Walter makes a distinction between so called "weak moral intuitionism" and "moral intuitionism", a stronger view in his mind. He argues that the weak moral intuitionists failed to stop the skeptical regress for its facit admission of the podential ability to draw an inference for a belief. The one actually challenging skeptics is the stronger intuitionist claim that "if a belief can be justified independently of any actual inference and also independently of any ability to draw any inference, then there is no dependence on any inference with any new premise that needs to be justified." The following arguments are mainly concerned with the stronger version of moral intuitionism.

Firstly, in an extreme contrast class, Walter displays intuitionist's inability of defending itself againt attack from nihilists. When a moral nihilist denies a proposition which is obviously true to moral intuitionists, what they can say is just to point out it is obviously right to us. "such moral beliefs appear obvious to almost everyone who is not a moral nihilist, but that appearacne is just what would be predicted by the moral nihilist's hypothesis that all moral beliefs are evolutionary or cultural illusions." However, as Walter correctly points out, "when both of two hypotheses would predict an observation, that observation cannot be used as evidence for one as opposed to the other. "

Secondly, walter turns to modest contrast. He asks: when do belidfs need confirmation? It is hard to give a direct judgement who is winner between intuitionist and its opponents. So Walter takes anologies to non-moral beliefs as as a strategy for his arguments. Through anologies, he summarizes the following principles: 1) Confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified when the believer is partial; 2) Confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified in holding a belief that other people deny or doubt, when the believer has no reson to prefer one believer to the other; 3) Confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified when the leliever is emotional in a way that clouds judgment. 4) Confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified when the circumstances are conducive to illusion. 5) Confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Then he argues that these epistimological principles also apply in the area of moral belief, therefore the confirmation is needed for justified moral beliefs and that this is enough to undermine moral intuitionism claiming that some believers are justified non-inferentially.

Walter then gives his responses against most possible objections. First of all, he raises a dilemma against who claim that their moral beliefs and believers are special. Simplistically express like this: moral intuitionist should assume that they themselves are also subject to problems indicated in section 9.4, unless they have some special reason to think that they are immune. "But if they do have a special resson to trust their own strongly held non-inferable moral beliefs, then that special reason is itself confirmation for those moral beliefs", which is compatible with walter's conclusion that confirmation is needed.

In the second place, Walter denies the possibility to confirm a moral belief without inferential ability. If the believer is aware of a confirmation, then the believer has enough information to be able to argue like this:
I hold this moral belief in circumstance like these.
If I hold a moral belief in circumstances like these, then it is usually true.
∴This moral belief is (probably) true.

Thirdly, walter corrects a misunderstanding about his approach, reclaiming that "I do not assume that justified believers must know or be justified in believing (or even be able to know or be justified in believing ) that they are justifiied."

Fourthly, responding to accuse of forgetting that a moral believer can be difeasibly justified without being adequately justified, Walter points out that an underminning defeater takes the force out of a reason without providing any reason to believe the opposite. That suggest that we have no reason to trust our immediate moral beliefs before confirmation. And undermining defeaters also have no reason to leave space for immediate moral beliefs without confirmation.

Finally, he argues that his principles do not lead to disaster, because his opinion is not that moral intuitions are not justified, but only that they are not justified non-inferentially because they need confirmation. And he also reclaims that his claims is completely compatible with everyday moral reasoning because although they do not need to formulate actual inferences, they still might need to be able to infer their moral beliefes in order to be justified. More basically, obiviousness does not show that a belief is not based on inference, much less that it is justified non-inferentially.

In the conclusion part, Walter examines the trival way in which some immediate moral beliefs might be modestly justified and asserts that all this technical way shows is just that these beliefs are assumed to be true in everyday contexts. "But what matters here is that moral intuitionism cannot show how any moral believer or belief be justified in any way that is sufficient to stop the skeptical regress".

Comments

In the article, Walter actually reveals an epistemological paradox. If you want to justify your moral beliefs you will face the skeptical regress; to avoid this, you can turn to intuitionism, but then you will confront the problom of uncertainty. According to Walter's arguments, you, as an intuitionist, has to make confirmation for your beliefs which will unavoidably lead to skeptical regress again. Under the pressure of Walter's arguments, I remind Wittgenstein's quote: "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". When Walter works on his best to open my mouth to defend for my moral beliefs, do I have the right to be silent? If I claim that I am an ituitionis on moral belief, do I mean that I believe that my moral beliefs are justified non-inferentially as he difined? According to Walter, I certainly have the right to be silent, but if I , as an intutionist, try to assert that moral intuitionism could be justified non-inferentially, then I would have to respond his questioning. As long as I open my mouth to try to say something, I am contradicting with my own stand. Is it a puzzle or a trap? Can you speak illogically?

Intuitionism implies that the moral believfs are not spoken out in language but does not mean that they do not exist. Some moral beliefs are just telling but not explaining for themselves. They present to people as self-evident truth and will be accepted by people unconditonally. When Walter tracts us to speak something for them, what he is doing is actually compelling us to reconsider these moral beliefs that you got immediately in some situation. And additionally I would like to admit that this kind of situation is arbitrary, or else, they would be able to be reconstructed in logical wards. Some moral beliefs present to you as self-evident beliefs.

Let's make an analogy. When I met Charlene, I got an impression that she is beautiful and I believed that this judgement was from intuition. Then you ask me why you think she is beautiful. If I try to answer your question, the only alternative is to reconstruct my impression about her and express them out in order to make you understand or believe my judgement, such as offering evidence like that she has beautiful eyes, slim gesture or attractive voice. However, let's imagine that there is another guy who does not think Charlene is beautiful, and offers the same kinds of evidence to support his judgment, then what you can find? I think we have reason to believe that there is something that concerns my own intrinstic form in my brain, the form of beauty conception. When Charlene's beauty fits the beauty form in my brain, then I will judge that she is beautiful. It is same in opposite condition. However, if I try to explain my judgment by offering the intrinsic form, I fall into Walter's trap again. No matter which kind of explanation I offered, they are not the certain proper or right explanation, so I also can say that I said nothing when I was saying that.

Walter give a very broad defination of inference and a very narrow defination of moral intuitionism. This setting likes a pair of scissors cutting down anything that is out of inferential justification. As long as you say something for your moral beliefs, you will fall into the trap designed by Walter. Is there any way to destroy Walter's trap? I think there are three ways. Firstly and also the best, you maintain to be silent. You see the truth which you can tell but can not explain. You can see it, that is enough. This response, I guess, will make Walter mad and abuse you irrational. Secondly, we can redefine concepts of intuitionism and inference. But this will change Walter's scheme and he may claim that we are talking about different things.

Lastly, the only alternative left is to destroy his arguments internally. According to Walter's defination, if the confirmation for believer to be justified is needed, the intuitionist claim fails. Ok, now let's imagine that I am a moral intuitionist. Under pressure from Walter's arguments, I need to confirm one of my moral beliefs. According to Walter's arguments, as long as I admit that confirmation is needed for my claim to be justified, I failed to be a moral intuitionist. Then he wins. It seems to be a little simplitical. In Walter's mind, it is not necessary to concern what kinds of justification I will give since they all will inevitably fall into inferential justification. But he ignores a kind of possibility that I tried all possible ways to justify my moral beliefs inferentially but failed in the end. And anybody who holds some kind of moral beliefs is unable to succeed as well. Is this a way to confirm that my moral beliefs are justified non-inferentially? It is, I think. Additionally, we need to note that it does not mean that my moral beliefs are wrong if I could not offer successful justification in the background of Walter's arguments because he claims again and again that "his opinion is not that moral intuitions are not justified, but only that they are not justified non-inferentially because they need confirmation." Now since we have no way to justify some of our moral beliefs, the things left for us is to accept them or not. I accept them.. Why? I will be silent.