References and main ideas.txt attached.
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Thursday, September 23, 2010
Friday, September 10, 2010
My aspiration
My aspiration
The aspiration for my life is concerned with two issues: one is the institution, the other is the culture. The former one focuses on building a well organized government. The later one focuses on generating well cultivated people. The two issues are complicatedly fixed together in fact. Only both of the two are achieved successfully, a well ordered society is possible to be established.
The aspiration for my life is concerned with two issues: one is the institution, the other is the culture. The former one focuses on building a well organized government. The later one focuses on generating well cultivated people. The two issues are complicatedly fixed together in fact. Only both of the two are achieved successfully, a well ordered society is possible to be established.
Notes on "What is postmodernism?" by Lyotard
Notes on "What is postmodernism?" by Lyotard
What Habermas requires from the arts and the experiences they provide is, in short, to bridge the gap between cognitive, ethical,and political discourses, thus opening the way to a unity of experience.
What Habermas requires from the arts and the experiences they provide is, in short, to bridge the gap between cognitive, ethical,and political discourses, thus opening the way to a unity of experience.
Realism
In the diverse invitation to suspend artistic experimentation , there is an identical call for order, a desire for unity, for identity, for security, or popularity.
The use of categories in aesthetic judgment would thus be of the same nature as in cognitive judgment.
Such realism accommodates all tendencies, just as capital accommodates all "needs" , providing that the tendencies and needs have purchasing power.
Artistic and literary research is doubly threatened, once by the "cultural policy" and once by the art and book market.
The objects and the thoughts which originate in scientific knowledge and the capitalist economy convey with them one of the rules which supports their possibility : the rule that there is no reality unless testified by a consensus between partners over a certain knowledge and certain commitments.
Modernity, in whatever age it appears, cannot exist without a shattering of belief and without discovery of the " lack of reality" of reality , together with the invention of other realities.
The sublime is a different sentiment. It takes place, on the contrary, when the imagination fails to present an object which might, if only in principle, come to match a concept.
To make visible that there is something which can be conceived and which can neither be seen nor made visible: this is what is at stake in modern painting...it will enable us to see only by making it impossible to see; it will please only by causing pain.
Postmodernism
Is is undoubtedly a part of the modern. All that has been received, if only yesterday , must be suspected. ... A work can become modern only if it is first postmodern. Postmodernism thus understood is not modernism at it's end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant.
The postmodernism would be that which, in the modern, put forward the unpresentable in the presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms,... A postmodern artist and writer is in the position of a philosophy: the text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by reestablished rules, and they can not be judged according to a determining judgment, by applying familiar categories to the text or to the work.
The answer is : let us wage a war on totality ; let us be witnesses to the unpresentable ; let us activate the differences and save the honor of the name.
Comments
We are in a slackening time! Yes, we are. But the conditions in different countries are crucially different. In those developed countries, the slackening implies the deconstruction of the totality project of modernity. However, in some east countries, the slackening may mean the withdraw to the time before enlightenment because they are still not enlightened enough. But some people should have equalized the problems of enlightenment to the problems of modernity. The problem of enlightenment is the mission of modernism. In contrast, the problem of modernity is the mission of postmodernism. When we confuse their distinction we will be on the wrong way to deal with problems that we are facing. For east society, it is crucially important to be clear what position they are in from the point of history.
Notes on "What is enlightenment?" by Immanuel Kant 1784
Notes on "What is enlightenment?" by Immanuel Kant 1784
The Art of Art History : A Critical Anthology
Oxford History of Art
Author: Preziosi, Donald
Publication: Oxford ; New York Oxford University Press (UK), 1998.
Immanuel Kant, 'What is Enlightenment?' from Kant Selections, Beck and Lewis White (eds), Macmillan Inc, New York © 1988, reprinted by permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc., Upper Saddle River, New Jersey
Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! 'Have courage to use your own reason!'—that is the motto of enlightenment.
For this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but freedom, and indeed the most harmless among all the things to which that term can properly be applied.
The touchstone of everything that can be concluded as a law for a people lies is the question whether the people could have imposed such a law on itself.
A greater degree of civil freedom appears advantageous to the freedom of mind of the people, and yet it places inescapable limitations upon it; a lower degree of civil freedom, on the contrary, provides the mind with room for each man to extend himself to his full capacity. As nature has uncovered from under this hard shell the seed for which she most tenderly cares—the propensity and vocation to free thinking—this gradually works back upon the character of the people, who thereby gradually become capable of managing freedom; finally, it affects the principles of government, which finds it to its advantage to treat men, who are now more than machines, in accordance with their dignity.*
Comments
What Kant emphasizes is the independence of subject. He advocates that individuals should dear to use their own reason when they are making judgment, rather not refer to authority. Meanwhile, Kant criticizes the oppression upon people's freedom of expression. He points that for the enlightenment, nothing is required but freedom. In short wards, enlightenment is a demand for people to use their reason freely without oppression from the authority. It is the project that was practiced by the western society. Whether did the project sketched by Kant succeed eventually? In one hand, Harbemas asserts that it is an incomplete project which need more efforts to be achieved. In the other hand, Lyotard claims that the project of enlightenment failed finally and further more we need to fight against the command of the totality which is the substantial characteristic of enlightenment.
However, what I see is the non balance of the enlightenment between different countries. Actually, the time is an age when the demand of enlightenment and postmodernism are fixed together. The project of enlightenment is not completed, that is, the subject has not been built up in some countries meanwhile the negative effect of modernity has become very apparent in some areas, which would have same effect on those countries that are in process of enlightenment. Therefore, we should notice that fact that some part of the world are facing the double commission of enlightenment and postmodernism. Obviously, the project in those regions would be more difficult and complicated.
Monday, September 6, 2010
Note on “Mill’s On Liberty: Introduction” by C.L.Ten
Note on "Mill's On Liberty: Introduction" by C.L.Ten
A summary of summary:
What is the nature of the liberty that Mill wanted to defend, and what are the sources of danger to it? In short, there are two kinds of resources of danger to individual liberty. The first one is the "social tyranny", which does not only imply the enforeful power of government but also the control of custom. The tyranny encroaches on both opinions and conduct and thereby prevents the development of genuine individuality. The second one is the potential mutual harm between individuals. If there is no necessary constraint on conduct to avoid that people harm one another freely, the individual liberty is impossible to be achieved. The former is advocating the absence of compulsion from government, while the later is claiming the necessity of the existence of social regulation. "so the problem is to estiblish a proper balance between individual independence and social control"(ML,2).
Where should the government have no control upon individual? Mill says that "the appropriate region of liberty " comprises: "first, the inward domain of consciousness; …liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects…Secondly, …liberty of tastes and persuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our character…without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly…freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others."(CW xviii,,225-6 [1,12]) In short, Mill expresses his view like this: "The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of persuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it"(CW xviii, 226 [1,13]).
Ten emphasizes the close connection between liberty and individuality. Without securing the appropriate region of individual liberty, "persons will lack individuality in that they are unable to form independent beliefs about the shape they want their own lives to take, nor are they able to lead their lives in accordance with their own conception of what a good life for them should be."(ML, 2-3) In the following paragraphs, Ten proceeds to interprate Mill's defense of liberty of thought and discussion as a deeper articulation of individuality. He points out that there is a shift from the likelihood of the opinion being true or false to the claim that every person should be able to judge for himself or herself the truth or falsity of an opinion. As he says, "if his argument has anything to do with the truth, it is evident that he is not so much concerned about whether freedom of expression will lead to the discovery of true beliefs, and all the individual and social benefits which such discoveries would bring. Rather, he is more interested in the manner in which people hold their beliefs, whether true or false"(ML, 4). A person can acquire a true opinion by simply relying on authority without any reflection. Mill rejects such an approach to the acquisition of true beliefs: "this is not knowing the truth" (Cwxviii, 244 [11,22]).
So called "knowing the truth" is to understand the meaning and grounds for one's own opinions, which need to keep them open to all arguments and evidence for and against these opinions. For Mill, individuals, who have "the dignity of thinking beings"(Cwxviii,243 [11,20]), will "accept as true only a belief that survives the challenges thrown at it in a free and open society where those holding diverse and conflicting views are encouraged to assert their opinions and debate with one another"(ML, 5).
In the case for liberty of conduct, Mill emphasizes the exercise of choice when people are carrying out their "experiments in living" at their own risk and peril. "He who does anything because it is the custom, makes no choice"(Cwxviii, 262 [111,3]). More important is that without choice something of great value would be missing. Individuality is a value that can be realized only when each person freely choose her own plan of life for herself.
Where should individuals be interfered by government? "The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others"(Cwxviii, 223-4[I,9]). Indeed Mill identifies the prevention of harm to others as the only legitimate ground for coercive interference with the conduct of a person. Self-harming and dislikeness in feeling or opinion could not be considered as harm to one another.
But some of Mill's comments indicate that his notion of harm includes elements which have bases independent of his account of individuality. For example, "a person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is just accountable to them for the injury."(Cwxviii,225 [I, II]). We may legitimately be compelled to perform many positive acts for the benefit of others. Although no detailed justification of these "social obligations" is given, they seem to rest on notions of reciprocity and mutual benefit. Ten points out that what counts as conduct harming the interests of others does not involve an appeal to individuality. Disagreements on these issues may need to turn to "the pinciples of efficiency, fairness, and productivity, which will determine each person's entitlement to the existing and future resources of the community"(ML,12).
Route for next week:
As we can see in the last paragraph of the summary, there is some elements in the principle of harm is not consistent with Mill's account of indivuduality in his defense of liberty. That implies that individuality is necessary but not the sufficient condition for individual liberty. To have a more coherent account of Mill's principle of liberty, we need to take his principle of utility into account. Henry R. West gives us an alternative to interpret Mill's principle from the point of principle of utility. Next week I will proceed to observe West's article of "Mill's case for liberty".
Notes
1. ML, abbreviation of Mill's On Liberty, ed. C.L.Ten, Cambrige University Press, 2008.
2. CW, abbreviation of The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. John M. Robson, University of Toronto Press, 1963-91.
Zhang Ming
A summary of summary:
What is the nature of the liberty that Mill wanted to defend, and what are the sources of danger to it? In short, there are two kinds of resources of danger to individual liberty. The first one is the "social tyranny", which does not only imply the enforeful power of government but also the control of custom. The tyranny encroaches on both opinions and conduct and thereby prevents the development of genuine individuality. The second one is the potential mutual harm between individuals. If there is no necessary constraint on conduct to avoid that people harm one another freely, the individual liberty is impossible to be achieved. The former is advocating the absence of compulsion from government, while the later is claiming the necessity of the existence of social regulation. "so the problem is to estiblish a proper balance between individual independence and social control"(ML,2).
Where should the government have no control upon individual? Mill says that "the appropriate region of liberty " comprises: "first, the inward domain of consciousness; …liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects…Secondly, …liberty of tastes and persuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our character…without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly…freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others."(CW xviii,,225-6 [1,12]) In short, Mill expresses his view like this: "The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of persuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it"(CW xviii, 226 [1,13]).
Ten emphasizes the close connection between liberty and individuality. Without securing the appropriate region of individual liberty, "persons will lack individuality in that they are unable to form independent beliefs about the shape they want their own lives to take, nor are they able to lead their lives in accordance with their own conception of what a good life for them should be."(ML, 2-3) In the following paragraphs, Ten proceeds to interprate Mill's defense of liberty of thought and discussion as a deeper articulation of individuality. He points out that there is a shift from the likelihood of the opinion being true or false to the claim that every person should be able to judge for himself or herself the truth or falsity of an opinion. As he says, "if his argument has anything to do with the truth, it is evident that he is not so much concerned about whether freedom of expression will lead to the discovery of true beliefs, and all the individual and social benefits which such discoveries would bring. Rather, he is more interested in the manner in which people hold their beliefs, whether true or false"(ML, 4). A person can acquire a true opinion by simply relying on authority without any reflection. Mill rejects such an approach to the acquisition of true beliefs: "this is not knowing the truth" (Cwxviii, 244 [11,22]).
So called "knowing the truth" is to understand the meaning and grounds for one's own opinions, which need to keep them open to all arguments and evidence for and against these opinions. For Mill, individuals, who have "the dignity of thinking beings"(Cwxviii,243 [11,20]), will "accept as true only a belief that survives the challenges thrown at it in a free and open society where those holding diverse and conflicting views are encouraged to assert their opinions and debate with one another"(ML, 5).
In the case for liberty of conduct, Mill emphasizes the exercise of choice when people are carrying out their "experiments in living" at their own risk and peril. "He who does anything because it is the custom, makes no choice"(Cwxviii, 262 [111,3]). More important is that without choice something of great value would be missing. Individuality is a value that can be realized only when each person freely choose her own plan of life for herself.
Where should individuals be interfered by government? "The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others"(Cwxviii, 223-4[I,9]). Indeed Mill identifies the prevention of harm to others as the only legitimate ground for coercive interference with the conduct of a person. Self-harming and dislikeness in feeling or opinion could not be considered as harm to one another.
But some of Mill's comments indicate that his notion of harm includes elements which have bases independent of his account of individuality. For example, "a person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is just accountable to them for the injury."(Cwxviii,225 [I, II]). We may legitimately be compelled to perform many positive acts for the benefit of others. Although no detailed justification of these "social obligations" is given, they seem to rest on notions of reciprocity and mutual benefit. Ten points out that what counts as conduct harming the interests of others does not involve an appeal to individuality. Disagreements on these issues may need to turn to "the pinciples of efficiency, fairness, and productivity, which will determine each person's entitlement to the existing and future resources of the community"(ML,12).
Route for next week:
As we can see in the last paragraph of the summary, there is some elements in the principle of harm is not consistent with Mill's account of indivuduality in his defense of liberty. That implies that individuality is necessary but not the sufficient condition for individual liberty. To have a more coherent account of Mill's principle of liberty, we need to take his principle of utility into account. Henry R. West gives us an alternative to interpret Mill's principle from the point of principle of utility. Next week I will proceed to observe West's article of "Mill's case for liberty".
Notes
1. ML, abbreviation of Mill's On Liberty, ed. C.L.Ten, Cambrige University Press, 2008.
2. CW, abbreviation of The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. John M. Robson, University of Toronto Press, 1963-91.
Zhang Ming
Wednesday, September 1, 2010
The time of the king
The time of the king
The king takes all my time; I give the rest to Saint-Cyr, to whom I would like to give all. Madame de Maintenon
1. She gives the rest which is nothing since the king takes it all from her.
2. "I would like to give all" indicates her infinite sigh of unsatisfied desire. Her desire would be there where she would like to give what she cannot give, the all, that rest of the rest of which she cannot make a present. Desire and the desire to give would be the same thing.
3. Derrida refers to a certain circle whose figure precipitates both time and the gift toward the possibility of their impossibility . The law of economy is a circle implying the idea of exchange, of return. But if there is gift, the given of the gift must not come back to the giving. In the sense , the gift might be impossible. Not impossible but the impossible.
4. Time is also considered as a circle . Wherever there is time, wherever time as circle , the gift is impossible. A gift could be possible only at the instant an effraction in the circle will have taken place. This instant of effractiion must no longer be part of time. In this sense one would never have the time of a gift.
5. If we are going to speak of it, we will have to name something. However, unless the gift were the impossible but not unnameable or unthinkable a dimension opens up where there is a gift.
6. Conditions of possibility of the gift designate simultaneously the conditions of the impossibility of the gift. In the logic of debit, the circulation of a good is not only that of the things but even of the values or the symbol and the intention to give , whether they are conscious or unconscious. Thus, in order to be a gift, it is necessary that donor and the donee do not recognize the gift as gift. If it present it self , it no longer presents it self.
7. Forgetting does not work as well in making a gift possible. Because for there to be forgetting in this sense, there must be gift. The gift would also be the condition of forgetting.
8. Forgetting and gift would be each in the condition of the other. Heidegger names forgetting as the condition of Being and of the truth of Being. The forgetting is another name of Being.
9. As the condition for a gift to be given, the forgetting must be radical not only on the part of the donee but on the part of the donor. There where there is subject and object , the gift would be excluded. A subject will never give an object to another subject.
10. The truth of the gift suffices to annul the gift. The structure of this impossible gift is also that of Being and of time.
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