Journal Entry of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong's "Intuitionism" of Moral Skepticisms
Summary
To avoid skeptical regress, we need turn to intuitions where the skeptical regress stops. According to Walter's definition of intuitionism, the simplitical intutionist claim is that "some moral beliefs are justified non-inferentially". What walter focuses on is neither specific areas conerning which moral beliefs are justified non-inferentially, nor which features of these moral beliefs make them justified non-inferentially, even nor psychological descriptions of ability to draw an inference or not. In contrast, he applies his arguments mainly to the central claim that all intuitionists share, namely, that "some believers are justified onn-inferentially in holding some moral beliefs."
Walter makes a distinction between so called "weak moral intuitionism" and "moral intuitionism", a stronger view in his mind. He argues that the weak moral intuitionists failed to stop the skeptical regress for its facit admission of the podential ability to draw an inference for a belief. The one actually challenging skeptics is the stronger intuitionist claim that "if a belief can be justified independently of any actual inference and also independently of any ability to draw any inference, then there is no dependence on any inference with any new premise that needs to be justified." The following arguments are mainly concerned with the stronger version of moral intuitionism.
Firstly, in an extreme contrast class, Walter displays intuitionist's inability of defending itself againt attack from nihilists. When a moral nihilist denies a proposition which is obviously true to moral intuitionists, what they can say is just to point out it is obviously right to us. "such moral beliefs appear obvious to almost everyone who is not a moral nihilist, but that appearacne is just what would be predicted by the moral nihilist's hypothesis that all moral beliefs are evolutionary or cultural illusions." However, as Walter correctly points out, "when both of two hypotheses would predict an observation, that observation cannot be used as evidence for one as opposed to the other. "
Secondly, walter turns to modest contrast. He asks: when do belidfs need confirmation? It is hard to give a direct judgement who is winner between intuitionist and its opponents. So Walter takes anologies to non-moral beliefs as as a strategy for his arguments. Through anologies, he summarizes the following principles: 1) Confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified when the believer is partial; 2) Confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified in holding a belief that other people deny or doubt, when the believer has no reson to prefer one believer to the other; 3) Confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified when the leliever is emotional in a way that clouds judgment. 4) Confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified when the circumstances are conducive to illusion. 5) Confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Then he argues that these epistimological principles also apply in the area of moral belief, therefore the confirmation is needed for justified moral beliefs and that this is enough to undermine moral intuitionism claiming that some believers are justified non-inferentially.
Walter then gives his responses against most possible objections. First of all, he raises a dilemma against who claim that their moral beliefs and believers are special. Simplistically express like this: moral intuitionist should assume that they themselves are also subject to problems indicated in section 9.4, unless they have some special reason to think that they are immune. "But if they do have a special resson to trust their own strongly held non-inferable moral beliefs, then that special reason is itself confirmation for those moral beliefs", which is compatible with walter's conclusion that confirmation is needed.
In the second place, Walter denies the possibility to confirm a moral belief without inferential ability. If the believer is aware of a confirmation, then the believer has enough information to be able to argue like this:
I hold this moral belief in circumstance like these.
If I hold a moral belief in circumstances like these, then it is usually true.
∴This moral belief is (probably) true.
Thirdly, walter corrects a misunderstanding about his approach, reclaiming that "I do not assume that justified believers must know or be justified in believing (or even be able to know or be justified in believing ) that they are justifiied."
Fourthly, responding to accuse of forgetting that a moral believer can be difeasibly justified without being adequately justified, Walter points out that an underminning defeater takes the force out of a reason without providing any reason to believe the opposite. That suggest that we have no reason to trust our immediate moral beliefs before confirmation. And undermining defeaters also have no reason to leave space for immediate moral beliefs without confirmation.
Finally, he argues that his principles do not lead to disaster, because his opinion is not that moral intuitions are not justified, but only that they are not justified non-inferentially because they need confirmation. And he also reclaims that his claims is completely compatible with everyday moral reasoning because although they do not need to formulate actual inferences, they still might need to be able to infer their moral beliefes in order to be justified. More basically, obiviousness does not show that a belief is not based on inference, much less that it is justified non-inferentially.
In the conclusion part, Walter examines the trival way in which some immediate moral beliefs might be modestly justified and asserts that all this technical way shows is just that these beliefs are assumed to be true in everyday contexts. "But what matters here is that moral intuitionism cannot show how any moral believer or belief be justified in any way that is sufficient to stop the skeptical regress".
Comments
In the article, Walter actually reveals an epistemological paradox. If you want to justify your moral beliefs you will face the skeptical regress; to avoid this, you can turn to intuitionism, but then you will confront the problom of uncertainty. According to Walter's arguments, you, as an intuitionist, has to make confirmation for your beliefs which will unavoidably lead to skeptical regress again. Under the pressure of Walter's arguments, I remind Wittgenstein's quote: "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". When Walter works on his best to open my mouth to defend for my moral beliefs, do I have the right to be silent? If I claim that I am an ituitionis on moral belief, do I mean that I believe that my moral beliefs are justified non-inferentially as he difined? According to Walter, I certainly have the right to be silent, but if I , as an intutionist, try to assert that moral intuitionism could be justified non-inferentially, then I would have to respond his questioning. As long as I open my mouth to try to say something, I am contradicting with my own stand. Is it a puzzle or a trap? Can you speak illogically?
Intuitionism implies that the moral believfs are not spoken out in language but does not mean that they do not exist. Some moral beliefs are just telling but not explaining for themselves. They present to people as self-evident truth and will be accepted by people unconditonally. When Walter tracts us to speak something for them, what he is doing is actually compelling us to reconsider these moral beliefs that you got immediately in some situation. And additionally I would like to admit that this kind of situation is arbitrary, or else, they would be able to be reconstructed in logical wards. Some moral beliefs present to you as self-evident beliefs.
Let's make an analogy. When I met Charlene, I got an impression that she is beautiful and I believed that this judgement was from intuition. Then you ask me why you think she is beautiful. If I try to answer your question, the only alternative is to reconstruct my impression about her and express them out in order to make you understand or believe my judgement, such as offering evidence like that she has beautiful eyes, slim gesture or attractive voice. However, let's imagine that there is another guy who does not think Charlene is beautiful, and offers the same kinds of evidence to support his judgment, then what you can find? I think we have reason to believe that there is something that concerns my own intrinstic form in my brain, the form of beauty conception. When Charlene's beauty fits the beauty form in my brain, then I will judge that she is beautiful. It is same in opposite condition. However, if I try to explain my judgment by offering the intrinsic form, I fall into Walter's trap again. No matter which kind of explanation I offered, they are not the certain proper or right explanation, so I also can say that I said nothing when I was saying that.
Walter give a very broad defination of inference and a very narrow defination of moral intuitionism. This setting likes a pair of scissors cutting down anything that is out of inferential justification. As long as you say something for your moral beliefs, you will fall into the trap designed by Walter. Is there any way to destroy Walter's trap? I think there are three ways. Firstly and also the best, you maintain to be silent. You see the truth which you can tell but can not explain. You can see it, that is enough. This response, I guess, will make Walter mad and abuse you irrational. Secondly, we can redefine concepts of intuitionism and inference. But this will change Walter's scheme and he may claim that we are talking about different things.
Lastly, the only alternative left is to destroy his arguments internally. According to Walter's defination, if the confirmation for believer to be justified is needed, the intuitionist claim fails. Ok, now let's imagine that I am a moral intuitionist. Under pressure from Walter's arguments, I need to confirm one of my moral beliefs. According to Walter's arguments, as long as I admit that confirmation is needed for my claim to be justified, I failed to be a moral intuitionist. Then he wins. It seems to be a little simplitical. In Walter's mind, it is not necessary to concern what kinds of justification I will give since they all will inevitably fall into inferential justification. But he ignores a kind of possibility that I tried all possible ways to justify my moral beliefs inferentially but failed in the end. And anybody who holds some kind of moral beliefs is unable to succeed as well. Is this a way to confirm that my moral beliefs are justified non-inferentially? It is, I think. Additionally, we need to note that it does not mean that my moral beliefs are wrong if I could not offer successful justification in the background of Walter's arguments because he claims again and again that "his opinion is not that moral intuitions are not justified, but only that they are not justified non-inferentially because they need confirmation." Now since we have no way to justify some of our moral beliefs, the things left for us is to accept them or not. I accept them.. Why? I will be silent.
Sunday, August 29, 2010
Saturday, August 28, 2010
Journal Entry of Brentel’s Intuition Pumps and the Proper Use of Thought Experiments
Journal Entry of Brentel's Intuition Pumps and the Proper Use of Thought Experiments
Summary:
Thought experiments are an important method of argumentation for philosophical and scientific theories. However, we should realise that thought experiments is also a way which easily causes fallacies when we praise its merits. "So we have to employ thought experiments carefully." According to Brendel, to use thought experiment, we need to avoid "intuition pumps". How to tread the role of intuition in thought experiments is crucially important.
First of all, let's cketch the outline of Brendel's article. At the beginning, he introduces three kinds of perspectives about the role of intuition in thoght experiments. The first kind of view is given by James Robert Brown who asserts that we gain new information through the help of intuitions. Intuitions in his mind is a priori access to a metaphysical realm. The second kind of view offered by Norton is sharply contrary to Brown's view. He thinks that thought experiments are indeed just arguments without any business with intuition. The last one is Danial Dennett's notion of intuition pumps which mean that thought experiments can lead us to a quick and uncritical jump to a conclusion by appealing to our intuition. Finally, Brendel claims he stands the side of Norton.
Before exposing his thorough critiques, Brendel provides an explication of "thought experiment". Firstly, he points out the similarity between thought experiments and real experiments, that they share the same kinds of certain theoretical requirements, ie., the plandned and controlled change of data, artificial situations on which variables depend, and their dependency on some background assumptions. Secondly, he clarifies their differences, the most obvious one of which is that "the aims of the thought experiment can be achieved without needing to perform a real experiment." Actually, I think all problems of thought experiments listed by Brendel onwards arise from the gap between thought experiment and real experiments, which give intuitions chance to mislead our judgements, because real experiments would pick out any obscure premise in the process of execution and modify them to promote the experiment in a right direction.
In this part, Brentel also lists thought experiments functions and purposes as followings: a) to prove the certain theories or concepts involve contradictions, b) to give supportinng evidence for a theory or a concept, c) to illustrate a complex or abstract position, and/or d) to detect vagueness or the borderline cases of a concept. Maybe because of these merits, we are able to accept thought experiment as a kind of method in theory. Therefore, it becomes more crucial for us to be aware their negative aspect and try to avoid them as Brendel did in the article.
In the third part, Brendel keenly critised Brown's mysterious account of thought experiments which mainly concerns the problem of the informativeness of thught experiments. Brown believes that Platonic thought experiments provides us a distinctive method, a priori access to knowledge, which is different from the empirical or inferential methods of scientific enterprises. Although Brown also admits the fallibility of a priori knowledge, Brendel, like Norton, thinks this kind of account of thought experiments is highly plausible. Firstly, he correctly points out in the example of Galileo's thought experiment that "the intuition that leads us to the conclusion that all bodies fall at the same speed is dependent on and controlled by our ecpirical and scientific knowledge", therefore, "there is no immediate grasp of the relevant laws of nature in the realm of universals". Secondly, he points out another defect of Brown's Platonic account that "it remains entirely unclear when and why an intuitive grasp of the abstract realm can go wrong". In contrast, he argues that "the justification of a thought experiment depends on this account on the justification of the premises involved and the conclusiveness of the inferential steps". Then Brendel offers a new account of thought experiments through reconstucting the same thought experiment. First, by uncovering its hidden premises we can avoid no argumative gap then we do not need Brown's "immediate jump". Second, instead of the intuitive capacity of perceiving the laws of nature, Brendel asserts that "in thought experiment we gain new information by rearranging or reorganizing already known empirical data in a new way and drawing new inferences fro them or by looking at these data from a different and unusual perspective".
Although Bendel shares many points with Norton, he did not go as far as him to claim that all thought experiments really are explicit arguments. He emphasizes the argument but meanwhile admits the role of intution in thought experiments, that is, fuctioning as background in many cases. This is concerned with his naturalistic account of intution. In his mind, "Intutions are best regarded as mental propositional attitudes which are accompanied by a strong feeling of certainty". So, he thinks we need not fly to the opposite extreme denying the value of intuition in thought experiment. To avoid the negative effect of obscure intuition, "we can always make these premises explicit by reconstucting the thought experiment as an argument".
In the fourth part, Brendel focuses one the problem of the legitimacy of the method of thought experiments. He thoroughly committed Dennett's notion of "inntuition pumps" in his argument. To articulate his opinions, he employed many famous examples of thought experiment to strengthen his arguments. But here we would slightly sketch the outline of his scheme.
What is so called "intution pumps"? According to Dennett's interpretation, it a certain sort of thought experiment, which often imploy highly suggestive imaginary scenarios that appeal to intuitions and give rise to particular intuitive conclusions where no rational and critical examination seems to be necessary. However, Brendel is very suspecious upon such sort of experiment and even thinks they are actually dangerous. So, in the following paragraphs, he explicates the reason why a intuition pump is implausible and the way how we could use thought experiments properly.
First of all, "the imaginary scenario should not be under-determined in relevant aspect". Or else it does not fufill the necessary requirement of a controlled change of data and the side-effects of this change. Secondly, the imaginary scenario employed in thought experiments may be specifically described and emblished. We should realise that the general conclusions are not justified by a single and specific example, or else, we may fail into intuition pumps. Thirdly, "counterfactual, fictional or idealized assumptions made in a thought experiment should always be irrelvant." In order to be able avoid the illegitimate employment of relevant counterfactual assumptions, we should try to make all the relevant background assumptions explicit as we can. Finally, thought experiment employed to apply a concept analysis in an unfamiliar situation can also be problematic, because our intuitions are not absolutely stable since they are products of our experence. But Brendel suggests that we should not reject such kind of thought experiments because they will be very helpful to clarify our intuition and analyse concepts as long as we could use them properly.
At the part of conclusion, Brendel summarized his opinions in a short paragraph, emphasizing that intuitions play an important role in the execution and interpretation of thought experiments and that we should employ thought experments carefully since it is easy to be misdirected into a intuition pump by illegitimate imaginary scenarios.
Comments:
I think there is an issue that Brendel ignored or did not clarify clearly, that is, intuitions involved in thought experiments are the parts that need to be uncovered merely for a clear premise for the argument or need also to be justified to be a legitimate premise? In another ward, when we try try to reflect the role of intuition in thought experiment we should not only focus on its cohenrance with the whole argument, but also should pay attention to the legitimacy of the intuition since they are originated from our experience and adaptation to the environment. These intuitions constitute a part of our considered judgments which are competetive with our rational pinciples in some cases. The main work Brendel did in the article seems like to answer the following question: are you sure about premises of your thought experiment? Brendel told us we need to uncover the hidden premises behind our intutions involved in the thought experiment and check it with other parts of the argument. But my further question is that: are you sure the premises you uncovered is legitimate itself? If the premise itself is wrong, the conclusion will be wrong even if the argument starting from the premise is consistent.To respond, you need to provide a justification to ensure me that it is a reasonable premise.
Zhang Ming
August, 2010
Summary:
Thought experiments are an important method of argumentation for philosophical and scientific theories. However, we should realise that thought experiments is also a way which easily causes fallacies when we praise its merits. "So we have to employ thought experiments carefully." According to Brendel, to use thought experiment, we need to avoid "intuition pumps". How to tread the role of intuition in thought experiments is crucially important.
First of all, let's cketch the outline of Brendel's article. At the beginning, he introduces three kinds of perspectives about the role of intuition in thoght experiments. The first kind of view is given by James Robert Brown who asserts that we gain new information through the help of intuitions. Intuitions in his mind is a priori access to a metaphysical realm. The second kind of view offered by Norton is sharply contrary to Brown's view. He thinks that thought experiments are indeed just arguments without any business with intuition. The last one is Danial Dennett's notion of intuition pumps which mean that thought experiments can lead us to a quick and uncritical jump to a conclusion by appealing to our intuition. Finally, Brendel claims he stands the side of Norton.
Before exposing his thorough critiques, Brendel provides an explication of "thought experiment". Firstly, he points out the similarity between thought experiments and real experiments, that they share the same kinds of certain theoretical requirements, ie., the plandned and controlled change of data, artificial situations on which variables depend, and their dependency on some background assumptions. Secondly, he clarifies their differences, the most obvious one of which is that "the aims of the thought experiment can be achieved without needing to perform a real experiment." Actually, I think all problems of thought experiments listed by Brendel onwards arise from the gap between thought experiment and real experiments, which give intuitions chance to mislead our judgements, because real experiments would pick out any obscure premise in the process of execution and modify them to promote the experiment in a right direction.
In this part, Brentel also lists thought experiments functions and purposes as followings: a) to prove the certain theories or concepts involve contradictions, b) to give supportinng evidence for a theory or a concept, c) to illustrate a complex or abstract position, and/or d) to detect vagueness or the borderline cases of a concept. Maybe because of these merits, we are able to accept thought experiment as a kind of method in theory. Therefore, it becomes more crucial for us to be aware their negative aspect and try to avoid them as Brendel did in the article.
In the third part, Brendel keenly critised Brown's mysterious account of thought experiments which mainly concerns the problem of the informativeness of thught experiments. Brown believes that Platonic thought experiments provides us a distinctive method, a priori access to knowledge, which is different from the empirical or inferential methods of scientific enterprises. Although Brown also admits the fallibility of a priori knowledge, Brendel, like Norton, thinks this kind of account of thought experiments is highly plausible. Firstly, he correctly points out in the example of Galileo's thought experiment that "the intuition that leads us to the conclusion that all bodies fall at the same speed is dependent on and controlled by our ecpirical and scientific knowledge", therefore, "there is no immediate grasp of the relevant laws of nature in the realm of universals". Secondly, he points out another defect of Brown's Platonic account that "it remains entirely unclear when and why an intuitive grasp of the abstract realm can go wrong". In contrast, he argues that "the justification of a thought experiment depends on this account on the justification of the premises involved and the conclusiveness of the inferential steps". Then Brendel offers a new account of thought experiments through reconstucting the same thought experiment. First, by uncovering its hidden premises we can avoid no argumative gap then we do not need Brown's "immediate jump". Second, instead of the intuitive capacity of perceiving the laws of nature, Brendel asserts that "in thought experiment we gain new information by rearranging or reorganizing already known empirical data in a new way and drawing new inferences fro them or by looking at these data from a different and unusual perspective".
Although Bendel shares many points with Norton, he did not go as far as him to claim that all thought experiments really are explicit arguments. He emphasizes the argument but meanwhile admits the role of intution in thought experiments, that is, fuctioning as background in many cases. This is concerned with his naturalistic account of intution. In his mind, "Intutions are best regarded as mental propositional attitudes which are accompanied by a strong feeling of certainty". So, he thinks we need not fly to the opposite extreme denying the value of intuition in thought experiment. To avoid the negative effect of obscure intuition, "we can always make these premises explicit by reconstucting the thought experiment as an argument".
In the fourth part, Brendel focuses one the problem of the legitimacy of the method of thought experiments. He thoroughly committed Dennett's notion of "inntuition pumps" in his argument. To articulate his opinions, he employed many famous examples of thought experiment to strengthen his arguments. But here we would slightly sketch the outline of his scheme.
What is so called "intution pumps"? According to Dennett's interpretation, it a certain sort of thought experiment, which often imploy highly suggestive imaginary scenarios that appeal to intuitions and give rise to particular intuitive conclusions where no rational and critical examination seems to be necessary. However, Brendel is very suspecious upon such sort of experiment and even thinks they are actually dangerous. So, in the following paragraphs, he explicates the reason why a intuition pump is implausible and the way how we could use thought experiments properly.
First of all, "the imaginary scenario should not be under-determined in relevant aspect". Or else it does not fufill the necessary requirement of a controlled change of data and the side-effects of this change. Secondly, the imaginary scenario employed in thought experiments may be specifically described and emblished. We should realise that the general conclusions are not justified by a single and specific example, or else, we may fail into intuition pumps. Thirdly, "counterfactual, fictional or idealized assumptions made in a thought experiment should always be irrelvant." In order to be able avoid the illegitimate employment of relevant counterfactual assumptions, we should try to make all the relevant background assumptions explicit as we can. Finally, thought experiment employed to apply a concept analysis in an unfamiliar situation can also be problematic, because our intuitions are not absolutely stable since they are products of our experence. But Brendel suggests that we should not reject such kind of thought experiments because they will be very helpful to clarify our intuition and analyse concepts as long as we could use them properly.
At the part of conclusion, Brendel summarized his opinions in a short paragraph, emphasizing that intuitions play an important role in the execution and interpretation of thought experiments and that we should employ thought experments carefully since it is easy to be misdirected into a intuition pump by illegitimate imaginary scenarios.
Comments:
I think there is an issue that Brendel ignored or did not clarify clearly, that is, intuitions involved in thought experiments are the parts that need to be uncovered merely for a clear premise for the argument or need also to be justified to be a legitimate premise? In another ward, when we try try to reflect the role of intuition in thought experiment we should not only focus on its cohenrance with the whole argument, but also should pay attention to the legitimacy of the intuition since they are originated from our experience and adaptation to the environment. These intuitions constitute a part of our considered judgments which are competetive with our rational pinciples in some cases. The main work Brendel did in the article seems like to answer the following question: are you sure about premises of your thought experiment? Brendel told us we need to uncover the hidden premises behind our intutions involved in the thought experiment and check it with other parts of the argument. But my further question is that: are you sure the premises you uncovered is legitimate itself? If the premise itself is wrong, the conclusion will be wrong even if the argument starting from the premise is consistent.To respond, you need to provide a justification to ensure me that it is a reasonable premise.
Zhang Ming
August, 2010
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