Notes on A.J.Julius' "Basic Structure and the Value of Equality"

Notes on A.J.Julius' "Basic Structure and the Value of Equality"

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls claims at the beginning that "the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of a society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation"(TJ, 6). That is to say, to evaluate whether a society is just or not, we do not have to know what everyone in the society is doing. It is enough to know how the basic structure of the society be arranged.

Following Rawls, in this article Julius argues that a basic structure is the subject of specifically egalitarian principles of distributive justice. As a matter of fact, what Julius plans to do is to offer a new version of Rawls' difference principle. According to Rawls' difference principle, inequalities in goods distribution are just "if they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society"(TJ 266).

Before proceeding to open her own argument, Julius recalls some difficulties for Rawls' account of distributive justice. Rawls plans to leave spaces for individual choice and action through the separation of institutional and personal spaces of decision. However, the separation implies that an inequality is not unjust if people can reverse it only by shift their personal decisions into special patterns. As G.A..Cohen points out, if we believe that basic structures are the subject of justice, we will conclude that justice principles fail to constrain those of our choices that play no part in shaping those structures.

Julius believes that Rawls' preoccupation with basic structure reflects not one but two distinct moral ideas. One is the idea that G.A.Cohen criticizes above. The other one is the thought that "social structures constituting societywide distributional mechanisms give rise to a set of sui generis obligations binding on the people who inhabit them, and that justice or a big, self-contained piece of justice consists in the satisfaction of those obligations"(BSVE, 327). In the following paragraphs, what Julius does is to argue how such kind of distributional mechanism is reasonable and possible.

Julius' arguments originate from a general idea that "parties to social interaction treat one another unfairly unless they aim for equality, and that fair treatment in interaction is their reason to aim for equality"(BSVE, 323). According to Kant, I must not treat you merely as a means. If I act with the intention of leading you to act in a way that advances my own interests, it implies I am framing you. To avoid treating you merely as a mean, I must not frame you unless I can justify doing so by appeal to your own interests.

Julius imagines a world where people in it interact interdependently in general. Everyone will find that her own action and interests are causally connected to the actions of manny other people. Then he argues that it is possible for every member of a group to combine for a common profile which is a list of sequences of individual actions, if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i)that her decision to act her part of that profile is supported by her belief that the others will act their parts;
(ii) that this belief of hers is supported by agreements she has reached with the others or by conversations she has had with them about what they will all do or by observation of actions that the others have chosen in order to promote this belief of hers;
and (iii) that she herself has promoted other's beliefs that she will act her own part of the profile.(BSVE, 329).
Once conditions of combination are satisfied, the efficient cooperation will be more profitable for every number. Since the combination permits me to share benefits produced by the cooperation, I will discover more and more possibilities to do so as to lead others to act in ways that benefit me. So in fact I am framing those others by my choice of this stance. But this framing must be justified to e everyone whose action is influenced by it.

Then Julius turns to the hypotheses of social reproduction. He try to justify the combination to everyone involved by explaining the process of social reproduction. He assumes that a person's situation is a list of factors relevant to the intentional explanation of her stance in interaction. These factors of situation might influence the characters of her basic interests, goals, and values,the classification of her possible actions, evaluation of consequences of her actions, and method for advancing her interests or goals. Once people's situations are stylized in certain ways, we can divid the population into types and all members of a type share the same situation. This implies a distribution of actions in the population. Then an assignment of situation and a distribution of actions by types together pick out a distribution of goods by types. Then we can describe the evolution of people's situations by some law of motion in the population distribution of actions. It implies that "some of interaction's invariances over time are explained by the mutual reproduction of pairs of situation assignments and action distributions, and that some of the similarities and differences between people's lives along distinct trajectories are explained by similarities and differences between the basic structures that those trajectories sustain"(BSVE, 330).

Since every path of interaction is attracted to some basic structure. Between two distinct structure X and Y, if I want to promote combination for X because I believe that interaction structured by X will run more to the advantage of people of my type, then I will have to justify the combination to people of other type that I am to frame. A basic structure is a shaper of action and also a distributor of goods.

If X were strictly best for every type, then we could justify combining for it by arguing that everyone does better there than in any alternative. But we cannot justify X to everyone by justifying it to each person considered in isolation from others since people's interests do not in fact go with each other. If the reproduction of X is to be justified to everyone, its justification to each person must instead invoke the constraint that it also be justified to others. Then the selection of X over other structures is justified. However, there is no distribution whose selection is acceptable to everyone outright, we must choose the distribution whose selection is most acceptable for the person for whom it is least acceptable. It follows that X can be justified to every type only if people of it's worst-off type do no worse than people of the worst-off type of any other structure.

This is Julius' argument for difference principle. His point is that just basic structures are those that everyone can knowingly reproduce without wrongly framing anyone. And he believe that a knowingly reproduction of some basic structure would survive all criticism from the point of view of framing.

Abbreviation:
TH. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.
BSVE A.J.Julius, Basic Structure and the Value of Equality, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 31, NO. 4 (Autumn, 2003), pp. 321-355.

Justice, Deconstruction, and Future

Justice, Deconstruction, and Future

" Justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible. No more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exist. Deconstruction is justice " (DPJ, 14-15).

Is Derrida really and seriously talking about justice? It is not surprising to see such kind of surprise that one, who does not understand Derrida and even holds bias with him, has when he or she first looks at his messages on justice. Honestly, so am I in my first sight at the lecture, or the first part of the lecture, that he reads at the colloquium on " Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice". Such kind of reaction originates from the widely extended interpretation in which Derrida is sketched as "the devil himself, a street-corner anarchist, a relativist, or subjectivist, or nihilist, out to destroy our traditions and institutions, our beliefs and values, to mock philosophy and truth itself, to undo everything the Enlightenment has done—and to replace all this with wild nonsense and irresponsible play" (DN, 36). With such kind of impression to Derrida, people do not believe that he would seriously talk about the topic of justice. In their mind, deconstruction just simply means destruction. However, here Derrida is talking about justice indeed and dears to claim that deconstruction is justice itself.

In a nutshell, although deconstruction generally goes against all kinds of things like nutshell, Caputo summarizes, "the very meaning and mission of deconstruction is to show that things—texts, institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs, and practices of whatever size and sort you need—do not have definable meanings and determinable missions, that they are always more than any mission would impose, that they exceed the boundaries they currently occupy"(DN,31). In the force of law, the first thing Derrida did is to break a nutshell, the common conception of justice as law (droit). One piece is law, another piece is justice, they are closely attached together, however, the core in the nutshell is force or violence. As Pascal argues, "justice without force is impotent. Force without justice is tyrannical. Justice without force is contradictory, as there are always the wicked; force without justice is accused of wrong. And so it is necessary to put justice and force together; and, for this, to make sure that what is just be strong, or what is strong be just"(DPJ,10-11). Following Pascal, the conclusion is that since it is impossible to make the just strong, the strong have been made just, that is, the strong which is made just is law. Then, Derrida turns to reinterpret Montaigne's discourse that "so laws keep up their good standing, not because they are just, but because they are law: that is the mystical foundation of their authority, they have no other..... Anyone who obeys them because they are just is not obeying then the way he ought to"(DPJ, 12). One obey them not because they are just but because they have authority. Here, Montaigne clearly distinguishes laws from justice. From their opinion, we can find that justice is something originally outside of laws, something that is attached to laws. The reason why laws are followed by people is that fact they are law, that is, they are the authority. However, the foundation of authority is mystical.

The simple distinction between laws and justice is not enough for Derrida, then he continues to interpret the mystical foundation of authority which implies something violent existing there. To unveil the mystery, he turns to the the very emergence of justice and law. He asserts that "the founding and justifying moment that institutes law implies a performative force.....its very moment of foundation or institution ......would consist of a coup de force, of a performative and therefore interpretative violence that in itself is neither just or unjust and that no justice and no previous law with its founding anterior moment could guarantee or contradict or invalidate"(DPJ, 13). "Since the origin of authority, the foundation or ground, the position of the law can't by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are themselves a violence without ground. Which is not to say that they are in themselves unjust, in the sense of 'illegal.' They neither legal nor illegal in their founding moment"(DPJ,14).

By describing the violent structure of the founding act, Derrida concludes that law is essentially deconstructible. For people who were misunderstanding Derrida, this is the very thing what Derrida wants to do and usually did, that is, to destroy the beliefs that we are holding, such as justice and law. When they hear that some thing is claimed to be deconstructible, what appears in their mind is that the thing would be destroyed by Drrida, just like here the authority is claimed to be without foundation except itself with violence.

However, Derrida have more things to say about justice, that they usually ignore or fail to understand. They usually just see the negative aspects in deconstruction but fail to see the positive aspect. In fact, there are two main points in their ignorance about Derrida's deconstruction: Firstly, they fail to see that deconstruction is calling for some new things to add onto the old ones when it is applied to some things. It is not to simply destroy old things, but rather tear the old things open in order to make it possible to be renewed. The other one is that they fail to see what deconstruction affirmed. Actually, when it is in application upon something that is constructible in its sense, deconstruction is also affirming some thing at the same time, that is, the things that are undeconstrutible. The two points are closely connected in the process of deconstruction. In the following paragraphs, we will explain what a big misunderstanding they make, and find that deconstruction actually is on our side.

When he claims that law is essentially deconstructible, Derrida continues to point out "the fact that law is deconstructible is not bad news. We may even see in this a stroke of luck for politics, for all historical progress"(DPJ, 14). From the deconstructive point of view, one thing will not have future whenever it is to stabilize, to paralyze, or to close itself. Therefore, deconstruction goes against such kind of tendency and tries to crack all nutshells that do not open itself to the future. This may be the very mission that deconstructionists put on their shoulder. Therefore, we could see the deconstructibility of law as a good news although deconstruction could not guarantee what it will be specifically. Deconstruction is a positive element in historical progress because it is deconstruction that keeps the history open to the future. Furthermore, deconstructability of law itself is valuable for deconstruction because the deconstructible structure of law make deconstruction possible. Derrida argues that law itself is constructible, so it is deconstructible, furthermore, it makes deconstruction possible. Maybe historical progress under such kind of relation between law and deconstruction is what it should be.

Even if we admit that deconstruction gives law a future, but what about the value of justice? Out of our sense, Derrida gives us a very different account and a very high position. " Justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible. No more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exist. Deconstruction is justice " (DPJ, 14-15). As you see, he also shows us a very surprising interpretation of deconstruction. Justice is the very thing that Deconstruction affirms. Justice is not deconstructible, however, it is just the undeconstructiblity of justice that makes deconstruction possible. Because without the undeconstructible deconstruction cannot be motivated, cannot find its movement and its impulse. In this sense, we can say that justice is what the deconstruction of law wants to bring about.

The deconstructibility of law makes deconstruction possible and the undeconstructibility of justice also makes deconstruction possible, thus, the result is that "deconstruction takes place in the interval that separates the undeconstructibility of justice from the deconstructibility of droit (authority, legitimacy, and so on)"(DPJ, 15). Deconstructioin stands in the gap between justice and law, one side gives deconstruction impulse and the other side is the object that it will crack, and both of them guarantee laws a future. "The future is not present, but there is an opening onto it; and because there is a future, a context is always open. What we call opening of the context is another name for what is still to come"(ATS,20). It is the progress through which deconstruction bents to pull new things into old things or to push old things open to the future. "Accordingly, everything in deconstruction......is organized around what Derrida calls l'invention de l'autre, the in-coming of the other, the promise of an event to come, the event of the promise of something coming"(DN, 42).

But justice is not a goal in the future that you can see or predesign. Once it could be foreseen then it would not be in the future, rather in the present. So deconstruction by justice refers to something unforeseeable but sill to come in the future. "Deconstructive analysis deprives the present of its prestige and exposes it to something tout autre, "wholly other," beyond what is foreseeable from the present, beyond the horizon of the ''same'(DN, 42). Therefore, the future is always open and further the context should be open. "it [deconstruction] is possible as an experience of the impossible, there where, even if it does not exist (or does not yet exist, or even never does not exist), there is justice"(DPJ,15). But this require the very experience of aporia. Justice means beyond the extreme boundaries, while the experience of the future is impossible for it does not allow passage. From this point of view, justice would be the experience that we are not able to experience. But Derrida thinks that there is no justice without the experience of aporia, no matter how impossible it may be. "Justice is an experience of the impossible. A will, a desire, a demand for justice whose structure wouldn't be an experience of aporia would have no chanced to be what it is, namely, a call for justice"(DPJ,16).

Aporia is the way to experience the impossibility. Maybe we can say that the "experience of impossibility" is just what deconstruction all about. "Deconstruction is the relentless pursuit of the impossible, which means, of things whose possibility is sustained by their impossibility, of things which, instead of being wiped out by their impossibility, are actually nourished and fed by it"(DN, 32). The impossible is undeconstructable because it beyond what we can see, namely, the possible. The possible, in Derrida's eyes, is a future, which is foreseeable and plannable, therefore, he call it the "present future". The experience means running against and beyond the limits of horizon, the present and the "present future". "To desire the impossible is to strain against the constraints of the foreseeable and possible, to open the horizon of possibility to what it cannot foresee or foretell"(DN, 134).

When we wait for the future that has been planned or predetermined, then we have annulled it. To open the future, it is necessary to free the value of the future from the horizon of present. Because the future, foreseen and pre decided possible is still limited in the present which need to be cracked from the point of view of deconstruction. That which defies any form of predetermination is singularity. "Justice always addresses itself to singularity, to the singularity of the other, despite or even because it pretends to universality"(DPJ, 20). There can be no future that is beyond the present and the "present future" unless there is radical otherness, and respect for this radical otherness. It is the way how justice participates in the future. Justice must be something that overflows law, which is always an ensemble of determinable norms and also be distinguished from what is general. "The singularity is what is always and already overlooked, out of sight, omitted, excluded, structurally, no matter what law, no matter what universal schema, is in place"(DN, 135).

Justice is never found in present order, justice is never present to itself. We can not see it but we can experience it by experiencing the impossibility when we meet aporia and where we are blocked. Why Derrida dear to say that "I know nothing more just than what I today call deconstruction"(DPJ, 21)? Because deconstruction is deeply and already engaged by the infinite demand of justice, for justice. Deconstruction is the experience of aporia, therefore it is the way of experiencing the impossible and the justice. Justice implies an opening to the future, and call for what is to come, to the coming of the other. "Justice calls, justice is to come, but justice does not exist"(DN, 154). However, although we know it does not exist, but we also know it is to come, therefore, by corresponding to its calling, we welcome a all new future.

DPJ, Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, Ed. D.G. Carlson , D. Cornell, and M.Rosenfeld, Routledge, 1992.
DN, Deconstruction in A Nutshell: a conversation with Jacques Derrida, Ed. J.D. Caputo, Fordham University Press, 1997.
ATS, A Taste for the Secret, J. Derrida, and M. Ferraris, tan. G. Donis, Ed. G.Donis, and D. Webb

References and main ideas.txt

References and main ideas.txt attached.

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My aspiration

My aspiration
The aspiration for my life is concerned with two issues: one is the institution, the other is the culture. The former one focuses on building a well organized government. The later one focuses on generating well cultivated people. The two issues are complicatedly fixed together in fact. Only both of the two are achieved successfully, a well ordered society is possible to be established.

Notes on "What is postmodernism?" by Lyotard

Notes on "What is postmodernism?" by Lyotard

What Habermas requires from the arts and the experiences they provide is, in short, to bridge the gap between cognitive, ethical,and political discourses, thus opening the way to a unity of experience.

Realism
In the diverse invitation to suspend artistic experimentation , there is an identical call for order, a desire for unity, for identity, for security, or popularity.

The use of categories in aesthetic judgment would thus be of the same nature as in cognitive judgment.

Such realism accommodates all tendencies, just as capital accommodates all "needs" , providing that the tendencies and needs have purchasing power.

Artistic and literary research is doubly threatened, once by the "cultural policy" and once by the art and book market.

The objects and the thoughts which originate in scientific knowledge and the capitalist economy convey with them one of the rules which supports their possibility : the rule that there is no reality unless testified by a consensus between partners over a certain knowledge and certain commitments.

Modernity, in whatever age it appears, cannot exist without a shattering of belief and without discovery of the " lack of reality" of reality , together with the invention of other realities.

The sublime is a different sentiment. It takes place, on the contrary, when the imagination fails to present an object which might, if only in principle, come to match a concept.

To make visible that there is something which can be conceived and which can neither be seen nor made visible: this is what is at stake in modern painting...it will enable us to see only by making it impossible to see; it will please only by causing pain.

Postmodernism
Is is undoubtedly a part of the modern. All that has been received, if only yesterday , must be suspected. ... A work can become modern only if it is first postmodern. Postmodernism thus understood is not modernism at it's end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant.

The postmodernism would be that which, in the modern, put forward the unpresentable in the presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms,... A postmodern artist and writer is in the position of a philosophy: the text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by reestablished rules, and they can not be judged according to a determining judgment, by applying familiar categories to the text or to the work.

The answer is : let us wage a war on totality ; let us be witnesses to the unpresentable ; let us activate the differences and save the honor of the name.

Comments
We are in a slackening time! Yes, we are. But the conditions in different countries are crucially different. In those developed countries, the slackening implies the deconstruction of the totality project of modernity. However, in some east countries, the slackening may mean the withdraw to the time before enlightenment because they are still not enlightened enough. But some people should have equalized the problems of enlightenment to the problems of modernity. The problem of enlightenment is the mission of modernism. In contrast, the problem of modernity is the mission of postmodernism. When we confuse their distinction we will be on the wrong way to deal with problems that we are facing. For east society, it is crucially important to be clear what position they are in from the point of history.

Notes on "What is enlightenment?" by Immanuel Kant 1784

Notes on "What is enlightenment?" by Immanuel Kant 1784

The Art of Art History : A Critical Anthology
Oxford History of Art
Author: Preziosi, Donald
Publication: Oxford ; New York Oxford University Press (UK), 1998.

Immanuel Kant, 'What is Enlightenment?' from Kant Selections, Beck and Lewis White (eds), Macmillan Inc, New York © 1988, reprinted by permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc., Upper Saddle River, New Jersey

Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! 'Have courage to use your own reason!'—that is the motto of enlightenment.

For this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but freedom, and indeed the most harmless among all the things to which that term can properly be applied.

The touchstone of everything that can be concluded as a law for a people lies is the question whether the people could have imposed such a law on itself.

A greater degree of civil freedom appears advantageous to the freedom of mind of the people, and yet it places inescapable limitations upon it; a lower degree of civil freedom, on the contrary, provides the mind with room for each man to extend himself to his full capacity. As nature has uncovered from under this hard shell the seed for which she most tenderly cares—the propensity and vocation to free thinking—this gradually works back upon the character of the people, who thereby gradually become capable of managing freedom; finally, it affects the principles of government, which finds it to its advantage to treat men, who are now more than machines, in accordance with their dignity.*

Comments
What Kant emphasizes is the independence of subject. He advocates that individuals should dear to use their own reason when they are making judgment, rather not refer to authority. Meanwhile, Kant criticizes the oppression upon people's freedom of expression. He points that for the enlightenment, nothing is required but freedom. In short wards, enlightenment is a demand for people to use their reason freely without oppression from the authority. It is the project that was practiced by the western society. Whether did the project sketched by Kant succeed eventually? In one hand, Harbemas asserts that it is an incomplete project which need more efforts to be achieved. In the other hand, Lyotard claims that the project of enlightenment failed finally and further more we need to fight against the command of the totality which is the substantial characteristic of enlightenment.
However, what I see is the non balance of the enlightenment between different countries. Actually, the time is an age when the demand of enlightenment and postmodernism are fixed together. The project of enlightenment is not completed, that is, the subject has not been built up in some countries meanwhile the negative effect of modernity has become very apparent in some areas, which would have same effect on those countries that are in process of enlightenment. Therefore, we should notice that fact that some part of the world are facing the double commission of enlightenment and postmodernism. Obviously, the project in those regions would be more difficult and complicated.

Note on “Mill’s On Liberty: Introduction” by C.L.Ten

Note on "Mill's On Liberty: Introduction" by C.L.Ten

A summary of summary:
What is the nature of the liberty that Mill wanted to defend, and what are the sources of danger to it? In short, there are two kinds of resources of danger to individual liberty. The first one is the "social tyranny", which does not only imply the enforeful power of government but also the control of custom. The tyranny encroaches on both opinions and conduct and thereby prevents the development of genuine individuality. The second one is the potential mutual harm between individuals. If there is no necessary constraint on conduct to avoid that people harm one another freely, the individual liberty is impossible to be achieved. The former is advocating the absence of compulsion from government, while the later is claiming the necessity of the existence of social regulation. "so the problem is to estiblish a proper balance between individual independence and social control"(ML,2).

Where should the government have no control upon individual? Mill says that "the appropriate region of liberty " comprises: "first, the inward domain of consciousness; …liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects…Secondly, …liberty of tastes and persuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our character…without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly…freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others."(CW xviii,,225-6 [1,12]) In short, Mill expresses his view like this: "The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of persuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it"(CW xviii, 226 [1,13]).

Ten emphasizes the close connection between liberty and individuality. Without securing the appropriate region of individual liberty, "persons will lack individuality in that they are unable to form independent beliefs about the shape they want their own lives to take, nor are they able to lead their lives in accordance with their own conception of what a good life for them should be."(ML, 2-3) In the following paragraphs, Ten proceeds to interprate Mill's defense of liberty of thought and discussion as a deeper articulation of individuality. He points out that there is a shift from the likelihood of the opinion being true or false to the claim that every person should be able to judge for himself or herself the truth or falsity of an opinion. As he says, "if his argument has anything to do with the truth, it is evident that he is not so much concerned about whether freedom of expression will lead to the discovery of true beliefs, and all the individual and social benefits which such discoveries would bring. Rather, he is more interested in the manner in which people hold their beliefs, whether true or false"(ML, 4). A person can acquire a true opinion by simply relying on authority without any reflection. Mill rejects such an approach to the acquisition of true beliefs: "this is not knowing the truth" (Cwxviii, 244 [11,22]).

So called "knowing the truth" is to understand the meaning and grounds for one's own opinions, which need to keep them open to all arguments and evidence for and against these opinions. For Mill, individuals, who have "the dignity of thinking beings"(Cwxviii,243 [11,20]), will "accept as true only a belief that survives the challenges thrown at it in a free and open society where those holding diverse and conflicting views are encouraged to assert their opinions and debate with one another"(ML, 5).

In the case for liberty of conduct, Mill emphasizes the exercise of choice when people are carrying out their "experiments in living" at their own risk and peril. "He who does anything because it is the custom, makes no choice"(Cwxviii, 262 [111,3]). More important is that without choice something of great value would be missing. Individuality is a value that can be realized only when each person freely choose her own plan of life for herself.

Where should individuals be interfered by government? "The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others"(Cwxviii, 223-4[I,9]). Indeed Mill identifies the prevention of harm to others as the only legitimate ground for coercive interference with the conduct of a person. Self-harming and dislikeness in feeling or opinion could not be considered as harm to one another.

But some of Mill's comments indicate that his notion of harm includes elements which have bases independent of his account of individuality. For example, "a person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is just accountable to them for the injury."(Cwxviii,225 [I, II]). We may legitimately be compelled to perform many positive acts for the benefit of others. Although no detailed justification of these "social obligations" is given, they seem to rest on notions of reciprocity and mutual benefit. Ten points out that what counts as conduct harming the interests of others does not involve an appeal to individuality. Disagreements on these issues may need to turn to "the pinciples of efficiency, fairness, and productivity, which will determine each person's entitlement to the existing and future resources of the community"(ML,12).

Route for next week:
As we can see in the last paragraph of the summary, there is some elements in the principle of harm is not consistent with Mill's account of indivuduality in his defense of liberty. That implies that individuality is necessary but not the sufficient condition for individual liberty. To have a more coherent account of Mill's principle of liberty, we need to take his principle of utility into account. Henry R. West gives us an alternative to interpret Mill's principle from the point of principle of utility. Next week I will proceed to observe West's article of "Mill's case for liberty".

Notes
1. ML, abbreviation of Mill's On Liberty, ed. C.L.Ten, Cambrige University Press, 2008.
2. CW, abbreviation of The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. John M. Robson, University of Toronto Press, 1963-91.

Zhang Ming

Notes about moral theory

The outline is given by my instructor Neil.

The time of the king

The time of the king

The king takes all my time; I give the rest to Saint-Cyr, to whom I would like to give all. Madame de Maintenon

1. She gives the rest which is nothing since the king takes it all from her.

2. "I would like to give all" indicates her infinite sigh of unsatisfied desire. Her desire would be there where she would like to give what she cannot give, the all, that rest of the rest of which she cannot make a present. Desire and the desire to give would be the same thing.

3. Derrida refers to a certain circle whose figure precipitates both time and the gift toward the possibility of their impossibility . The law of economy is a circle implying the idea of exchange, of return. But if there is gift, the given of the gift must not come back to the giving. In the sense , the gift might be impossible. Not impossible but the impossible.

4. Time is also considered as a circle . Wherever there is time, wherever time as circle , the gift is impossible. A gift could be possible only at the instant an effraction in the circle will have taken place. This instant of effractiion must no longer be part of time. In this sense one would never have the time of a gift.

5. If we are going to speak of it, we will have to name something. However, unless the gift were the impossible but not unnameable or unthinkable a dimension opens up where there is a gift.

6. Conditions of possibility of the gift designate simultaneously the conditions of the impossibility of the gift. In the logic of debit, the circulation of a good is not only that of the things but even of the values or the symbol and the intention to give , whether they are conscious or unconscious. Thus, in order to be a gift, it is necessary that donor and the donee do not recognize the gift as gift. If it present it self , it no longer presents it self.

7. Forgetting does not work as well in making a gift possible. Because for there to be forgetting in this sense, there must be gift. The gift would also be the condition of forgetting.

8. Forgetting and gift would be each in the condition of the other. Heidegger names forgetting as the condition of Being and of the truth of Being. The forgetting is another name of Being.

9. As the condition for a gift to be given, the forgetting must be radical not only on the part of the donee but on the part of the donor. There where there is subject and object , the gift would be excluded. A subject will never give an object to another subject.

10. The truth of the gift suffices to annul the gift. The structure of this impossible gift is also that of Being and of time.